Research
Publications
I'm Coming Out! How Voter Discrimination Produces Effective LGBTQ Lawmakers
PS: Political Science and Politics – March 2025
Abstract
Are LGBTQ legislators effective lawmakers? We build on theories that link voter discrimination to legislative effectiveness by arguing that voters’ biases against LGBTQ candidates narrow the candidate pool, leading to the election of only the most experienced and qualified LGBTQ candidates. As a result of this electoral selection effect, we expect that LGBTQ legislators will be more effective lawmakers than their non-LGBTQ counterparts. To test this, we combine data on state legislators’ LGBTQ identification with their State Legislative Effectiveness Scores (SLES). Our findings reveal that LGBTQ legislators are meaningfully more effective than non-LGBTQ legislators. To link our findings to voter discrimination, we leverage over-time variation in discrimination toward LGBTQ individuals. Across four tests, we consistently find that LGBTQ lawmakers elected in high-discrimination environments are more effective than those elected from less discriminatory environments.
Manuscripts Under Review
The Consequences of Elite Action Against Elections
Invited to Revise and Resubmit at the British Journal of Political Science<\strong>
Abstract
Do governing elites who engage in undemocratic practices face accountability? We investigate whether American state legislators who publicly acted against the 2020 presidential election outcome sustained meaningful sanctions in response. We theorize that repercussions for undemocratic activities are selective---conspicuous, highly visible efforts to undermine democratic institutions face the strongest ramifications from voters, politicians, and parties. In contrast, less prominent actions elicit weaker responses. Our empirical analyses employ novel data on state legislators' anti-election actions and a weighting method for covariate balance to estimate the magnitude of punishments for undemocratic behavior. The results evidence heterogeneity, with the strongest consequences targeting legislators who appeared at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2021, and weaker penalties for lawmakers who engaged in other antagonism toward democracy. We conclude that focusing sanctions on conspicuous acts against democratic institutions could leave less apparent---but still detrimental---efforts to undermine elections unchecked, ultimately weakening democratic health.
Selective Reciprocity in Bipartisan Collaboration: How Majority Security Shapes Legislative Success Award-Winning Paper
Under Review
Abstract
How does majority party security shape reciprocal bipartisan collaboration and influence legislative success? U.S. state legislatures vary widely in the stability of majority control, offering a valuable opportunity for examining how party security conditions the incentives for cross-party collaboration. Insecure majorities may foster reciprocity as both a behavioral norm and a strategic path to legislative advancement, while long-term one-party control can diminish the returns to bipartisan engagement. I develop a theory of selective reciprocity, arguing that majority security fundamentally restructures how legislators engage in and benefit from bipartisan collaboration. Drawing on data from 401,720 bills introduced across 43 state legislatures between 2009 and 2018, I construct novel measures of bipartisan collaboration to evaluate reciprocity. I find that minority party legislators build reputational capital by consistently cosponsoring majority party bills---but their efforts yield few legislative gains in secure majority chambers. Instead, majority legislators selectively reciprocate only on minority party initiatives unlikely to pass, preserving the appearance of cooperation while protecting their policy agenda. By contrast, in insecure chambers, bipartisan cooperation is more likely to produce substantive outcomes. Reciprocity endures but is constrained---selective in form, asymmetric in effect, and structured by the institutional advantages of majority control. These findings raise broader concerns about the marginalization of minority legislators and the limits of representation under conditions of majority security.
The Bipartisan Path Revisited: Collaboration and Lawmaking in U.S. State Legislatures CEL Working Paper Series
Under Review
Abstract
Does bipartisan collaboration enhance legislative success in U.S. state legislatures, as it does in Congress? This article extends Harbridge-Yong, Volden, and Wiseman (2023), who find that members of Congress are more effective lawmakers when they attract a greater share of cosponsors from the opposing party. I adapt their framework to the state level using an orig- inal dataset of 401,720 bills introduced across 43 state legislatures between 2009 and 2018. These data enable new, fine-grained measures of bipartisanship, capturing both legislators’ ability to attract out-party cosponsors and their willingness to cosponsor legislation introduced by the opposing party. On the whole, bipartisanship is positively associated with lawmaking success in the states, as it is in Congress. Notably, however, substantial variation across legislatures---such as institutional rules and design, party competition, and majority security--- likely shape the contours of bipartisan collaboration. These findings underscore the value of state legislatures for evaluating how structural features of policymaking environments condition cross-party collaboration and open avenues for comparative institutional research.
Outcome-Consequential Campaigning. CEL Working Paper Series
Invited to Revise and Resubmit at Legislative Studies Quarterly<\strong>
Abstract
Campaigns can feature simple electoral posturing or actual commitments of behaviors that politicians will engage in upon being elected. But can campaigns also offer insights into likely policy outcomes, including those resulting from collective policymaking? To address this question, we take advantage of new scholarship highlighting the enhanced lawmaking effectiveness of bipartisan legislators (Harbridge-Yong et al. 2023). We identify bipartisan campaigners from among more than 800 congressional Representatives. Despite increased polarization, since the year 2000 more than a third of congressional freshmen invoked bipartisan language on the campaign trail. These bipartisan campaigners became effective lawmakers. Their enhanced effectiveness was especially pronounced in Representatives’ earlier terms in office and linked to the lawmaking stages requiring significant coalition-building activities. These findings suggest that campaigns offer voters meaningful insights not only into candidates’ subsequent behaviors regarding the issues they attend to and the legislative votes they take, but also into policy outcomes via their effective lawmaking.
Why Citizens Dislike Professional Legislatures: White-Collar Government and Policymaking for the Wealthy
Under Review
Abstract
The steady professionalization of American state legislatures over the past several decades has created a key tension in political representation: state publics disapprove of professionalized legislatures, on average, yet those legislatures are best equipped to represent their policy preferences. We explain part of this paradox by arguing that citizens’ objections to professionalization stem from distrust of “white-collar” legislators—lawmakers from high socioeconomic classes, who are overrepresented in professionalized chambers. These legislators’ policy priorities are viewed as misaligned with the average citizen’s, which reduces approval more than any opposition to institutional reforms that enhance legislative capacity. A pre-registered conjoint experiment demonstrates support for this claim; citizens do not oppose the institutional expansion of resources for conducting lawmaking. Rather, they react negatively to representation from white-collar lawmakers, whom they associate with professionalized legislatures. Further, we demonstrate in temporal observational analyses of economic outcomes in the states that this opposition is justified. State-level income inequality and poverty have increased in association with the professionalization of state legislatures over time. These findings challenge existing accounts by suggesting that disapproval of legislative professionalism is a rejection of governing by economic elites—not of reforms intended to support legislators and facilitate the process of policymaking.